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considerations suggest coupling 
liberalization with compensation. Since 
those opposed to freer trade often fight 
against liberalization, an offer to 
compensate displaced workers for their 
losses might convince some groups to 
change their position and offer support 
instead, making freer trade easier to 
achieve. 
The academic literature is surprisingly 
silent regarding the design of optimal 
policies aimed at compensating displaced 
workers. Indeed, there is only a modest 
amount of literature devoted to any issue 
related to compensating those harmed by 
liberalization.4 One reason is that the vast 
majority of all of the academic research 
connecting worker welfare and 
globalization begins from a premise of 
frictionless factor markets, where all 
adjustments that might be motivated by 
liberalization occur instantly. These 
models focus on the long run and leave no 
room to address many of the concerns 
outlined above. 
In our monograph, International Trade 
and Labor Markets: Theory, Evidence, 
and Policy Implications (Davidson and 
Matusz 2004), we first show that 
traditional trade analysis can rather easily 
be extended to allow for equilibrium 
unemployment, job displacement, and 
gradual adjustment, and that doing so 
provides many new insights. We then use 
our extended model to tackle difficult 
issues such as the one raised above: if 
society desires to compensate those who 
are harmed by liberalization, what is the 
best way to go about it? 
The general-equilibrium model that we 
use to address the issue of optimal 
compensation has several important 
components that are missing from 
standard trade models. In our model, 
workers must first train to acquire skills 
and then search for employment in either 
While academicians generally 
argue that reducing trade barriers 
enhances aggregate welfare, legislation 
aimed at liberalizing trade often meets 
fierce opposition in public and political 
arenas. Counted among the opposition are 
groups concerned about the losses 
suffered by workers whose jobs disappear 
under the weight of import competition. 
Even academic economists, who tend to 
rail against protectionist sentiment, 
readily admit that freer trade does harm 
some groups, perhaps even displaces 
workers. 
Indeed, a burgeoning literature 
attempting to measure the losses to 
dislocated workers has produced some 
disquieting findings. For example, 
Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) 
estimate that the average dislocated 
worker suffers a loss in expected lifetime 
income of $80,000. Kletzer (2001) finds 
similar but less-dramatic results. In her 
study, the average dislocated worker takes 
a 12 percent pay cut, while the median 
worker sees her wage fall by 5 percent. 
Troubled by such large personal losses, 
some academic economists have joined 
the growing movement in the policy 
community in calling for direct 
compensation of workers dislocated by 
trade liberalization.1
For more than half a century the 
benefits of freer trade have been 
understood in the context of the 
Samuelson compensation principle: the 
winners gain enough from liberalization 
to allow them to fully compensate the 
losers without exhausting all of their 
gains.2 Thus, one way of viewing those 
who have been pushing for “wage 
insurance” for dislocated workers is that 
they are just taking this argument to its 
logical conclusion—if we can afford to 
compensate these workers, we should.3 
After all, if we choose to liberalize trade, 
we must realize that we are choosing to 
harm some groups. One might argue that 
equity requires coupling policies aimed at 
liberalizing trade with policies aimed at 
compensating displaced workers.
Not everyone would find an equity-
based argument for compensation 
compelling. Some might point out that the 
dislocated workers were receiving 
economic rents when trade barriers 
protected their jobs, calling into question 
policies that would provide these workers 
with even more compensation by 
subsidizing them when they switch 
sectors. Even in the absence of equity 
considerations, practical political 




“One might argue that equity 
requires coupling policies aimed 
at liberalizing trade with policies 
aimed at compensating displaced 
workers . . . even in the absence 
of equity considerations, 
practical political considerations 
suggest coupling liberalization 
with compensation.”
“The academic literature is 
surprisingly silent regarding 
the design of optimal policies 
aimed at compensating 
displaced workers.”
NOTE: This article highlights some of the 
research findings that appear in the 
authors’ new book, International Trade 
and Labor Markets, which was published 
by the Upjohn Institute.
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increasing in the wage, which is 
increasing in ability. Thus, workers with 
high ability value wage subsidies more 
highly than their lower-ability 
counterpart. This makes the wage subsidy 
an attractive tool to use when 
compensating the movers—the average 
mover will value the program much more 
than the marginal worker—thus, a 
modest-sized program can be used, 
generating only a small amount of 
inefficient labor reallocation. In contrast, 
the wage subsidy will lead to too much 
labor reallocation if used to compensate 
the stayers. This is due to the fact that the 
marginal worker will value the wage 
subsidy considerably more than the 
average stayer (since the average stayer 
has lower ability than the marginal 
worker).
As there are no distortions in our 
model (other than the initial tariff), we 
know that the gains from trade are large 
enough to fully compensate those harmed 
by liberalization, but theory alone does 
not tell us if the costs of the compensation 
are large or small relative to the gains 
from trade. To get a handle on the relative 
magnitude of the costs of compensation, 
we close our monograph by calibrating 
the model using parameter estimates 
based on U.S. labor market data. We find 
that the overall cost to society is likely to 
be modest, (in terms of deadweight loss) 
provided the right policy is used. 
However, attempting to compensate the 
losers might completely wipe out the 
gains from freer trade if the wrong policy 
is used.
We find that there are two rules that an 
optimal compensation program should 
satisfy. First, a program should have a 
large impact on the welfare of the average 
worker in the targeted group. If that is the 
case, then full compensation can be 
achieved with only a modest-sized 
program. Second, if we define the 
marginal worker to be the worker who is 
just indifferent between high- and low-
tech jobs under free trade, then an optimal 
program should have only a small impact 
on this worker’s welfare. The reason for 
this is that any compensation scheme 
distorts incentives and results in some 
workers making inefficient labor market 
decisions. If the marginal worker’s 
welfare is largely insensitive to the policy 
measure, then full compensation can be 
achieved while generating only a small 
amount of labor misallocation.
Applying these two rules, we find that 
it is optimal to use a wage subsidy to 
compensate movers, whereas an 
employment subsidy (a subsidy to 
employed workers which is independent 
of the wage) works best to compensate 
the stayers. The main reason for the 
difference in the policy prescription has to 
do with the composition of the workforce 
in the two sectors: the high-tech sector is 
populated with high-ability workers, 
whereas the low-tech sector attracts 
largely low-ability workers. As a result, 
the average high-tech worker has higher 
ability than the marginal worker, whereas 
the average low-tech worker has an 
ability level below that of the marginal 
worker. With a wage subsidy, the size of 
the transfer received by a worker is 
a “high-tech sector,” where significant 
skills and training are required and wages 
are high, or a “low-tech sector,” in which 
training is quick and cheap, far fewer 
skills are required, and pay is low. We 
assume that workers vary in ability, and 
we show that equilibrium results in all 
workers with ability above a critical level 
being drawn to the high-tech sector with 
all other workers in low-tech jobs. 
To study the issue of adjustment and 
compensation, we assume that the low-
tech sector is initially protected by a small 
tariff and then show that liberalization 
harms two groups: those low-tech 
workers who choose to shift to the high-
tech sector (the movers), and those 
workers who remain trapped in the 
(previously protected) low-tech sector 
because they do not have enough skills to 
make the acquisition of high-tech jobs 
attractive (the stayers). The movers, who 
are the displaced workers in our setting, 
lose for two reasons. First, although some 
wind up with better-paying jobs after 
relocating, others take a pay cut when 
they find reemployment in the high-tech 
sector. Second, these workers bear all of 
the adjustment costs imposed on the 
economy by liberalization—they must 
first retrain and then search for new jobs, 
both of which are costly processes. 
We then turn to the issue of 
compensation by searching for the policy 
that fully compensates each group for 
their losses while imposing the smallest 
deadweight loss on the economy.5 One of 
the advantages of our model is that it is 
rich enough to allow us to compare all of 
the compensation programs that have 
been at the center of the policy debate: 
wage subsidies, employment subsidies, 
training subsidies, and unemployment 
insurance (which is basically what trade 
adjustment assistance has been in the 
United States).
“. . . if society desires to 
compensate those who are 
harmed by liberalization, what is 
the best way to go about it?”
“One of the advantages of our 
model is that it is rich enough 
to allow us to compare all of the 
compensation programs that 
have been at the center of 
the policy debate: wage 
subsidies, employment subsidies, 
training subsidies, and 
unemployment insurance . . .”
“By formally modeling the 
training and search processes 
that are at the core of the 
adjustment process, our 
monograph is one of the first 
rigorous treatments of the type 
of policy concerns that arise 
when we take into account 
adjustment costs.”
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The continuing rapid pace of global 
integration brings with it a continuing 
flow of displaced workers. It is 
incumbent upon policy analysts to 
carefully consider the distribution and 
magnitude of adjustment costs that stem 
from global shocks, and to think deeply 
about the optimal design of policies 
targeted at reducing those costs. By 
formally modeling the training and search 
processes that are at the core of the 
adjustment process, our monograph is 
one of the first rigorous treatments of the 
type of policy concerns that arise when 
we take into account adjustment costs. 
Our hope is that our work demonstrates 
that such issues can be tackled in tractable 
settings, and that this will trigger other 
academics to start taking these issues 
more seriously.
Notes
1. See, for example, Jacobson, LaLonde, and
Sullivan (1993); Parsons (2000); and Kletzer
(2001).
2. This argument ignores the fact that such com-
pensation is rarely offered.
3. See, for example, Baily, Burtless, and Litan
(1993); Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993);
Burtless et al. (1998); Parsons (2000); Kletzer
(2001); Kletzer and Litan (2001); and Hufbauer and
Goodrich (2001).
4. There are a small number of papers that are
relevant. First, there are those that ask whether the
losers could be compensated by the winners without
eating away all the gains from freer trade. Using a
traditional full employment model of trade, Dixit
and Norman (1980, 1986) have shown that there
does indeed exist a commodity tax scheme that can
achieve this objective—thus, liberalization can lead
to a true Pareto gain. However, Brecher and
Choudhri (1994) and Feenstra and Lewis (1994)
have raised concerns about whether this scheme will
work when unemployment is present or factors of
production are not perfectly mobile. 
Second, a paper by Brander and Spencer (1994)
focuses on the optimal design of a wage subsidy
program aimed at compensating dislocated workers
for their losses. In a simple partial equilibrium
model in which the distribution of wages is held
fixed, they compare wage subsidies programs in
which the subsidy is tied to the gap between the pre-
liberalization wage and the postliberalization wage
earned by displaced workers. Their goal is to deter-
mine whether the subsidy should be an increasing or
decreasing function of this gap. Their analysis finds
support for the Lawrence and Litan (1986) position
that the wage subsidy should be “tapered”—that is,
they show that the optimal subsidy is decreasing in
the wage gap.
5. As noted above, society may wish to offer
such compensation due to equity concerns or simply
to make it easier to enact liberalizing legislation.
Both Carl Davidson and Steven Matusz are 
professors of economics at Michigan State 
University, and external research fellows 
with the Leverhulme Centre for Research 
on Globalization and Economic Policy at 
the University of Nottingham.
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